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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY.

By Robert Scigliano. New York:

The Free Press. 1971. Pp. viii, 233. $6.50.
Studies of the Supreme Court in relation to the legislative process have been
produced rather regularly by constitutional historians and lawyers. But much less
notice has been paid to the Court and the executive branch. A great deal of attention has been lavished, of course, upon individual appointments to the Court
made by various Presidents. But few scholars have troubled to step back and
view the entire record of relations. Robert Scigliano has done that in this new
study and he has accomplished his task with detachment, insight, and considerable success.
His thesis is that these two branches of the national government have had
a "special relationship" to each other that neither has had to the Congress. This
has existed in part because of the basic powers possessed by the two. Each is
concerned with the execution of the law and thus they share a common perspective on governmental problems. But even more importantly, the drafters of
the Constitution deliberately strengthened the judiciary and the executive in order
to offset the power of Congress. Madison, Washington, Hamilton, and their
colleagues in Philadelphia in 1787 felt that the legislative power posed the
greatest danger to any system of "separate but equal," and they assumed the
judicial and executive branches would act together to keep from being absorbed
into the legislative vortex. Thus individual liberty would be best protected.
What emerged from the Constitutional Convention was not a formal
alliance but an informal one. It was because he perceived this alliance that
Washington as the first President saw nothing wrong in appointing Chief Justice
John Jay a Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain simultaneously with his
holding a judicial position, or in asking Jay, along with his own department
heads, for advice on policy matters and for ideas for proposed legislation.
The record of American history reveals, as the author argues, that the
Supreme Court has indeed been closer to the President than to the Congress.
The Presidency has had the dominant voice in the appointing of Justices, and
the extra-curiam relations of those appointees with the White House have been
numerous and close. Both of these points are examined in special detail by
Scigliano.
In regard to the first-the selection of judicial nominees-he finds that
partisanship, the timing of appointments, and the threat of senatorial courtesy
have the most important bearing. When the President and a majority of the
Senate have been of the same political party, Presidents have naturally been
much more likely to get their nominations approved than when they have been
of different parties. In the latter instances, the chief executives have infrequently
(only eleven times of twenty-six) had their nominations accepted.
The timing of appointments is also connected with the Senate's reaction to
them. When they have been made in the first three years of a President's term
of office, nominees have been able to join the Court without great difficulty (in
1078
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eighty-seven instances out of a hundred). When, on the other hand, they have
been made in the last year of a term or in the interregnum between the nonre-election of a President and his successor's assumption of office, they have met
with much less success (twenty-two failures out of thirty-four).
But it is neither partisanship as such nor the timing of appointments as
such that accounts for most Presidential troubles in Court nominations, but
rather the two factors in combination. When Presidents have given opposition
Senates end-of-term nominations, these have almost invariably met with a dismal
fate. In the last year of an incumbent's term, the opposition party appears to be
moved by an understandable compulsion to have vacancies on the bench held for
the next President, hoping naturally that he would be of their political persuasion. When the election has already taken place and an opposition candidate
has won, the desire becomes irresistible.
Scigliano sees senatorial courtesy as much less a factor in filling Supreme
Court vacancies that in appointments to the district or the appeals courts, both
of which have definite geographical ties. But when a particular region or state
has become associated with a seat on the Court, such as when the state has
received at least two immediately preceding nominations for the seat in question,
Presidents have been disposed to consult with the senators representing the area.
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have most often exerted this influence.
In choosing men to serve on the Court, the author surprises no historian by
saying that the White House is most often moved by professional, representational, and doctrinal qualifications. The first is symbolized by the fact that every
Justice has not only been a lawyer but has also practiced law at some time in
his career and has traditionally been a man of high moral character, eminent in
his public or private career, a few exceptions notwithstanding. Prior judicial
service has been a more important factor to Republican Presidents who have
tended to be more legalistic and less political in their thinking than their
Democratic counterparts. But such prior service, of course, does not make better
Justices or, historians often forget, worse ones either.
Representational qualifications refer to those attributes in a prospective
Justice that link him to a significant segment of the American public. The main
categories would be political party affiliations, geographic origins, religion, and
ethnic background. The importance of the first is clear when it is noted that
eighty-nine of our ninety-eight Justices have been of the same party as the
Presidents who selected them.
Geographic balance has been a weighty consideration from the time of
George Washington's very first nominations to the Court, though it had become
somewhat less crucial in the twentieth century until Richard Nixon's "southern
strategy" revived it in the ill-fated Haynsworth and Carswell choices. The
abolition of circuit-riding in 1891 weakened the case for sectionalism substantially.
But with the decline of geography has come the rise of religion and
ethnicity. There has been a Catholic and a Jewish seat on the Court regularly
in this century. It is probable that a Negro on the Court is now an unofficial
imperative and that a woman's seat need not be far off. While representational
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qualifications would seem to tie the hands of a President to a certain extent, they
can also aid him. First, they tend to simplify a difficult choice by pointing him
towards persons with particular credentials. Secondly, he can play one off against
another if he so chooses. He can prefer section over religion or vice versa depending on his political gameplan.
The significance of doctrinal qualifications needs no elaboration. Only when
the Supreme Court has posed no important threat to the chief executive's
programs have Presidents relaxed their guard here. Theodore Roosevelt, in a
1906 letter to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, made clear this concern when he
said of a prospective Justice:
He is right on the Negro question; he is right on the power of the
federal government; he is right on the insular business; he is right about
corporations; and he is right about labor."
But do Presidents usually get what they expect when they place a man who
is "right" on the Court? Scigliano's conclusion is that they do. Insofar as an
evaluation can be made in this difficult area, apparently Justices live up to
expectations about three-quarters of the time. This figure should hardly be
startling considering that Presidents have personally known about sixty per cent
of the persons they have selected for the Supreme Court.
What, however, about that remaining one-quarter who proved to be
judicial mavericks? How did the executive branch blunder in their choice?
The easy answer is that the Presidents thought their candidates held different
views than they actually did. The explanation sometimes lies in insufficient
checking on the part of advisers to the President. Sometimes also a chief executive may assume that he knows how a man will act generally from a stand on a
single issue. Woodrow Wilson expected James McReynolds, an ardent antitrust
advocate, to be equally liberal on all issues. No President was ever more wrong.
Mistakes can be made also simply because a man can change his mind once
he dons judicial robes. John Marshall, it will be recalled, had an uncanny ability
for converting good Jeffersonian appointees into even better Federalist Justices.
A sense of loyalty to the Court itself can modify a Justice's presumed philosophy
as well. Constitutional historians have long suspected that Chief Justice Hughes'
voting pattern in the New Deal cases was as much shaped by his concern for
the Court as an institution as by the issues being argued.
The problem of out-of-Court relations between the Justices and 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue are examined in this study too. They are seen as taking
three forms. Justices have engaged in activities related to their judicial responsibilities, such as advising on legislation affecting the judiciary or appointments
to court positions. They have also accepted temporary service in some executive
capacity (e.g., Jay as Minister to Great Britain or Robert Jackson as chief
American prosecutor at Nuremberg), and they have acted as political advisers
to Presidents, the most questionable role of all.

1 R.
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While much of this extra-curiam work has not been sufficiently consequential
to matter, the author feels it all would have been better left undone. The exception can be noted though in the case of political crises so grave that they
require all the moral authority that the American society can muster to resolve
peacefully. Once faced with such an emergency, even though the Supreme Court
runs a risk of sacrificing part of its reputation, the duty must be accepted. The
service of five Justices on the Electoral Commission formed to resolve the disputed
presidential election of 1876, a political struggle that threatened for a time to
escalate into a new civil war, illustrates such an instance.
The Court's "special relationship" with the Presidency has intensified, if
anything, in recent years. A trend toward the increased democratization of
American life has enhanced the power of the White House more than the
Congress or the states. And as the chief executive has gained strength, so also
has his ally, the Supreme Court. It has become sufficiently bold to move into
areas where the Congress and even the President have chosen not to act. Civil
rights and electoral redistricting are just two of the areas involved.
But there is a danger for the Court here too. As the Presidency has gained
in strength, it has shown itself less than willing to brook interference from the
bench. While it has been three decades since the last significant confrontation
between the two, a new conflict could be possible and it would find the Court
much less able to defend itself than in the past.
Robert Scigliano's treatment of his subject is brief. He makes no attempt
to delve into the specifics of past episodes in the relations between the two
branches. It is rather assumed that the reader is familiar with the details of
that story. For the reader who is, this interpretive essay on the topic can be
especially rewarding.
C. Joseph Pusateri*

ASSAUTLT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS. By Arthur
Miller. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1971. Pp. xiv, 333.
$7.95.
Assault on Privacy, the most recent in a series of red alerts to the problems of
privacy in the new technological era, focuses attention on the use of the computer in amassing unprecedented quantities of personal data by virtually every
modem American social and commercial institution and the consequent threat
to the private citizen's right to be left alone.
Despite Stanley Kubrick's futuristic horror sequence about a computer
running amuck in 2001: A Space Odyssey, computers do not themselves
"assault" privacy. Unlike wiretaps, electronic bugging devices or infra-red
photography or computers do not physically intrude or invade, peep or eavesdrop.
Rather, because of the computer's incredible capacities to store, classify, and
* Ph.D. St. Louis University, 1965.
John Carroll University.

The author is Associate Professor of History at
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instantly retrieve virtually limitless data, new technology has grafted onto the old
human snooping instinct an immense and unforgetting electronic memory.
Professor Miller sees in this new data-gathering capability the wherewithal
to make new intrusions on personal privacy feasible and potentially threatening.
Information which two decades ago simply was not collected because of its
sheer bulk and dispersion is now routinely collected and stored in the data banks
of credit bureaus, insurance companies, police departments and all levels of government, with new and more varied uses of computer dossiers in the offing. At
the root of the problem is the erosion of the individual's ability to control the
circulation of information relating to him, a vital form of personal autonomy
essential to forming social relationships and preserving personal freedom. Historically, this fundamental power to control personal information was inadvertently protected-no organization could efficiently collect, use or make
available meaningful personal information on a wide range of subjects. Data
from the 1880 census, for instance, took nearly 10 years to collect and collate, by
which time it was hopelessly outdated and virtually unusable. Similarly, because
information could not be effectively centralized, the source of personal data was
more readily accessible for confrontation and challenge: the local tax collector
and the village gossip were at least available for argument.
Informational technology has had the effect of creating a wider and therefore less accessible audience for personal information. Conclusory or subjective
evaluations by former educators, employers, or creditors receive a new air of
objectivity once entered in the data banks, making an error or a malicious falsehood in a man's dossier more broadly disseminated, but more difficult to challenge. Even accurate information-the fact that a man had a juvenile police
record, for example, or that he once declared bankruptcy-could condemn him
to a "data prison" of foreclosed job opportunities and denied credit for the rest
of his life, once committed to the unforgetting memory cells of the data banks.
Data stored in a central location could be subjected to tampering by technically
proficient "data-saboteurs" who could destroy, alter, or introduce false information into the system. Highly selective advertising or political campaigns could
be directed at particular individuals based on their spending habits as gleaned
from their computerized billings and bank statements. At the far fringe of possibility is the potential for psychological or political repression if computers are
linked to surveillance mechanisms-television monitors, optical scansion of mail,
even the implantation of body sensors in persons guilty of "suspicious conduct."
In a slightly tongue-in-cheek chapter entitled "The Psychological Effects of
a Dossier Society," Miller discusses the developing computer counter-culture
which seems intent on violating contemporary society's Eleventh Commandment:
THOU SHALT NOT FOLD, BEND, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE. Some
militant devotees of the subculture hold two or more social security cards in
order to maintain multiple data lives, while more enterprising disciples speculate
that by erasing their tax records from the Internal Revenue Services computer
tapes, they could transform themselves into untaxable non-persons.
Despite such resistance, the growth of computer and telecommunication
complexes housing vast stores of information seems to be an irresistible societal
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impulse. In 1967, the Bureau of the Budget proposed a National Data Centera single, centralized, statistical data bank which was to merge existing bodies of
government information then diffused among a variety of federal agencies.
Although outcries by Congress and the press ensured that the proposal was
aborted, various agencies of government are now studying common multi-access
computer networks.
The development and use of data banks have not been confined to the
federal government. Credit information bureaus, for instance, reportedly maintain dossiers on an estimated 100 million Americans for use by credit-granting
institutions, employers, and insurance companies. Normally the data in a credit
dossier contains predictable data on whether a particular subject is a "slow" or
"fast" pay, his earnings and employment history, but occasionally-when there
is a demand for more specialized information-may contain the opinion of a
neighbor as to the stability of his marriage, his drinking habits, records of hospitalization for mental disorders, or information as to his political or religious
persuasion. Rarely is this specialized information verified, and not until recently
were there any controls on its uses or accuracy. As the demand for retail credit
increases, greater reliance on this kind of information seems inevitable.
The most ominous of Professor Miller's observations relate to the use of
intelligence and personality tests in schools and business. He objects to the
illusion that subjective human qualities can be given a numerical hardness, that
individual creativity, drive, ambition, or sociability can be objectively computed
and scored. Language-oriented I.Q. exams can unfairly reduce the scores of
minority students or job applicants who lack facility with middle-class English,
and can be used more unfairly throughout their educational or job careers as the
given limits of their intellectual capacity and achievement poteitial. Questions
asked on some personality tests in pseudo-professional guise amount to outright
invasions of privacy ("About how often do you go to Church?" ... "To what
race does your father belong?") if not salaciousness and psychological voyeurism
("Do you think there is something wrong with your sex organs?" . . . "Are you

a special agent of God?"). Because a security clearance, a military commission,
or a job may depend on their co-operation, most test applicants have little
alternative but to answer. More foreboding is Miller's belief that today's schools,
with their programmed learning machines, television lectures, and audio-visual
devices, may be slowly numbing students' sensitivities to this kind of technological dehumanization.
Unfortunately, the federal government has not been an exemplar in balancing data efficiency and personal privacy. Census information, the chief function
of which is to provide the statistical basis for Congressional apportionment, is
made available to other federal agencies as well as profit making organizations
with apparently few cost or procedural restraints. Other information freely given
by an individual to one government agency for a carefully defined purpose may
find its way into the hands of another agency without his knowledge or consent.
Tax returns, for example, may be scrutinized by federal law enforcement agencies
seeking a criminal prosecution. While this kind of dogged criminal investigation may not be objectionable, the recent episode of the Army's investigations
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of private citizens for the FBI demonstrates that mutual back-scratching among
government agencies may not be confined to criminal matters.
This proclivity for data gathering and sharing by the federal government
is emphasized by recent legislation. The Freedom of Information Act,1 which
requires broad disclosures of certain government information, does not, in
Professor Miller's estimation, give proper consideration to the competing policy
of personal privacy, or to the new issues growing out of the government's use of
computer data banks. Equally anachronistic in the age of computer technology
are portions of the new Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 2 which give law
enforcement officials explicit-albeit limited-authority to intercept certain
telephone communications, but which exert no controls over computer data
transmissions, or protection for persons who are the subjects of such transmissions.
All of this means to Miller that the law of privacy-such as it is--has simply
not worked. In several highly readable chapters tracing the legal history of
privacy from Warren and Brandeis' landmark 1890 Harvard Law Review
article' to Ralph Nader's recent lawsuit against General Motors, he demonstrates
that traditional tort and constitutional law theories of privacy have not kept
pace with the rapid social and technological innovations of the last century.
Successful litigants have had to rely on the intrusive, morally offensive, defamatory, or economically injurious aspects of the defendant's conduct, while
legal actions seeking to vindicate simple control over private information have
floundered. More importantly, he criticizes legal mechanisms which place the
burden of establishing wholesale and often difficult to prove injuries on an individual who may lack the funds, energy or conviction to prosecute a lawsuit.
Equally unsuitable have been various attempts to fit privacy into the old
theorems of property and trust law. Not only is personal information incorporeal and therefor subject to infinite duplication and dissemination, but
also involves a concept of personal reputation and community standing fundamentally distinct from the notion of ownership and proprietary interest.
Miller proposes instead an elaborate system of regulatory controls over
organizations using data bank technology. He envisions a new federal agency
staffed by telecommunications and computer specialists, lawyers, businessmen,
and social scientists who would study and promulgate rules governing the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information by computer utilities and
sensitize the public to privacy issues by conducting hearings and symposia and
by instituting grievance mechanisms, including fair hearings and ombudsmen.
He sees the need for employing various computer hardware and software
devices and physical safeguarding techniques to protect the data bank environment against unwarranted intrusions, tampering, and accidental dumping of vital
data. He advocates professionalizing information handlers.
None of these recommendations are particularly novel or necessarily correct.
Different industrial or governmental uses of computer dossiers will very possibly

1
2
3

5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. iii, 1968).
42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hxv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
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require varying degrees and species of control apart from the administrative regulation he proposes. Nor is it helpful in discussing a subject which is already
emotionally charged to infuse speculations as to the future of personal privacy
with a sense of Orwellian nightmare. Nonetheless, Professor Miller has successfully exorcised the demons of the new informational technology, and while he
may not have dispelled them, he has done an admirable job of containing them in
this highly readable and illuminating book.
Richard W. Tomc*

* A.B., John Carroll University, 1967; LL.B., Harvard, 1970; Member, New York Bar.
The author is an attorney for the IBM Corporation, Armonk, New York. The opinions and
conclusions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the IBM Corporation.

BOOKS RECEIVED
ADAM CLAYTON POWELL AND THE SUPREME COURT.

By

Kent M. Weeks. Dean

Weeks chronicles the efforts of Harlem's celebrated and controversial congressman to have his exclusion from the House of Representatives overturned by the courts. His conclusion is that Powell's victory in the Supreme
Court was a Pyrrhic one. Although establishing an important Constitutional
principle, Powells success was at the expense of a loss of effective representation for Harlem at a time when Harlem needed representation most. New
York: Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc. 1971. Pp. viii, 311. $8.95.
AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID. By Alan L. Sorkin. The author characterizes Indian reservations as "open air slums." Extensive examination is
made of Indian education and health. The inadequacies in programs for
agricultural development, welfare services, and manpower development are
pinpointed and a program for improvement of these services is proposed.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1971. Pp. viii, 231. $7.50.
BLACK RESISTANCE/WHITE LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN

AMERICA. By Mary Frances Berry. Professor Berry's thesis is that government has used the Constitution in such a way as to make it the instrument
for maintaining the racial status quo. Her conclusion is that government
has demonstrated a lack of imagination in eradicating racial prejudice.
Because government, as a projection of the white majority in America,
finds it convenient and desirable to suppress the black minority, it systematically fails to act in the face of blatant discrimination and legitimatizes
its inaction by the maintenance of a Constitutionally authorized scheme of
separation of federal and state rights. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
1971. Pp. xi, 268. $3.95 (paperbound).
THE COURT-MARTIAL OF LT. CALLEY. By Richard Hammer. Journalist Hammer, who covered the trial from beginning to end, gives a colorful and
dramatic account of the trial and its participants. The bulk of the book
deals with the well-planned prosecution of Captain Aubrey Daniel and the
ill-prepared and inadequate defense given Calley. Hammer basically
agrees with the decision of the jury and deplores the attitude of those who
regard Calley as a hero or scapegoat. New York: Coward, McCann &
Geoghegan, Inc. 1971. Pp. 398, $7.95.
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. Edited by Donald R. Cressey. Despite the fact
that the topic has been extensively covered in recent years, this collection of
articles, all of which originally appeared in the New York Times, breathes
new life into the discussion of how to stem the always increasing amount of
crime. The most interesting portion of the book is a series of articles dealing
with experiments in changing the criminal justice system. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1971. Pp. 289. $2.45 (paperbound).
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS. By
William E. O'Connor. The author evaluates the complex network of 2,500
bilateral agreements dealing with airline schedules, routes, rules, and fares.
The author evaluates the trend toward creating a multilateral agreement
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and puts forth a proposal for such a system of regulation which he believes
would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, a country which has traditionally
objected to any delegation of sovereign authority. New York: Praeger
Publishers. 1971. Pp. xi, 189. $15.00.
EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY.

By Robert G. Dyck.

The author carefully examines the history of air pollution control policymaking, especially with regard to criteria and standards of emission. Federal
financing, enforcement measures, and public participation in policy-making
are explored in depth. Pittsburgh: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. 1971. Pp. vii, 285. $9.00
(paperbound).
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEG-

REGATION.

By J. W. Pettasan. Mr. Pettasan illustrates the role of the

judiciary in enforcing the Brown decision. Case histories of specific desegregation actions are examined with particular attention paid to the individual
district court judges hearing each action. The book is as much sociological
as it is legal and is a fascinating study of judges under stress. Originally
published in 1961, an epilogue brings the book up to date. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1971. Pp. 288. $2.95 (paperbound).
FREE

& FAIR: COURTROOM AcCESS AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRrNE. Edited by

John M. Kittross and Kenneth Harwood. The two main topics dealt with
by the editors are the access of broadcasters to the courtroom for the purpose
of reporting the developments of a case and the broader question of the
fairness with which broadcasters treat controversial issues and individuals.
Particular attention is paid to Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and to the Estes and Red Lion decisions. Philadelphia: Association for
Professional Broadcasting Education. 1970. Pp. vi, 202. Price unreported
(paperbound).
HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY: A STUDY OF LESS THAN HONORABLE DIsCHARGE. By Colin J. Williams and Martin S. Weinberg. The authors'
treatment of homosexuality in the military is basically sociological. Investigation is made into the number of homosexuals in the military, the number
who satisfactorily complete their service, the number who are discovered
and expelled, and the effects upon those who are discovered, labelled, and
expelled. Extensive statistical data is included. The book is the fifth in
a series published by the Institute For Sex Research. New York: Harper &
Row. 1971. Pp. xii, 221. $8.95.
INTERSTATE CoMPACTS:

A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM. By Marian E. Ridge-

way. Professor Ridgeway principally examines the interstate compacts in
one state: Illinois, with emphasis placed on the Illinois perspective. Particular attention is focused upon the Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development
Compact, the Great Lakes Basin Compact, the Wabash Valley Interstate
Compact, and the Interstate Oil Compact. Her conclusion is that these
compacts represent an important, permanent, and necessary change in the
federal system. States may now bridge the barriers of local boundaries to
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deal with modem economic and social problems. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press. 1971. Pp. xiii, 385. $10.00.
LAND

SUBDIVISION

REGULATION:

POLICY

AND

LEGAL

CONSIDERATIONS

FOR

Professor Yearwood examines the question of whether cities and counties can enact and enforce
subdivision regulations as a primary tool in urban and regional planning.
He traces the history of zoning controls and subdivision regulations and
focuses on problems of enforcement of such regulations. Separate chapters
deal with the problems of developments, performance bonding, and park
and school land dedication. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1971. Pp. xiv,
315. $16.50.
POISONED POWER: THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR POwER PLANTS. By John
W. Gofman and Arthur R. Tamplin. The authors, noted scientists, argue
that even small amounts of radioactivity can cause substantial harm. They
further argue that nuclear power plants are not only undesirable but unnecessary. The Atomic Energy Commission is criticized for its promotional
efforts in the nuclear power plant area. The authors charge that the AEC's
promotional efforts have resulted in a failure to adequately gauge the
dangers to health and life which are presented by nuclear plants. Emmans, Pa.: Rodale Press, Inc. 1971. Pp. 368. $6.95 (paperbound).
TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DISPUTES. By Walter A. Maggiolo. Of
importance to the practitioner, this book concentrates substantially on the
practical aspects of mediating a labor dispute. Techniques for controlling
the meeting, use of caucuses, minimizing membership rejection of recommended settlements and avoidance of common pitfalls are all explored in
detail. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1971. Pp. x, 192.
$10.00.
TREASON IN AMERICA: DISLOYALTY VERSUS DISSENT. By Jules Archer. The
author attempts to formulate of definition of treason by sketching the
histories of notable dissenters in American history from colonial times to the
present. The question of when dissent advances to the point of disloyalty
is raised but not answered. The book is readable but somewhat superficial
in its analysis of the topic. New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc. 1971. Pp.
198. Price unreported.
URBAN

WHAT TO

PLANNING.

Do WITH

By Richard M. Yearwood.

YOUR BAD CAR: AN ACTION MANUAL

FOR LEMON OWN-

By Ralph Nader, Lowell Dodge, and Ralf Hotchiss. In this latest
of what has become a long line of Nader-sponsored consumer rights literature, the authors contend that "lemons" are planned as such on the automobile manufacturers' drawing boards. The authors explain how to avoid
purchasing a defect-ridden automobile and the most effective grievance
procedure to follow once an automobile reveals itself as a "lemon." Appendices include addresses of major automobile executives, a key to code
marks on tires, precautions to take before ordering a new automobile, and
what the buyer should do before accepting a new automobile. New York:
Bantam Books, Inc. 1971. Pp. xi, 241. $1.50 (paperbound).
ERS.

